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Abstract
This work aims to test the equilibrium relations of two international macroe-
conomics models for Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Brazil. The first model is
the rational expectation hypothesis (REH) where three key relations will be
tested: Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIP)
and the Fisher Parity condition. The second model follows the line of though
of Imperfect Knowledge Economics (IKE) where two equilibrium relations will
be tested. According to IKE, even under the assumption that agents are ra-
tional, the presence of speculative behavior in financial markets helps explain
the long swings often observed in the behavior of exchange rates. The results
support the view that the predictions of the IKE model hold for Colombia,
while those of the REH hold for both Brazil and Mexico. Mixed findings are
obtained for Chile.
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1 Introduction
“All theory depends on assumptions which are not quite true. That is what makes it
theory. The art of successful theorizing is to make the inevitable simplifying assumptions
in such a way that the final results are not very sensitive... When the results of a theory
seem to flow specifically from a special crucial assumption, then if the assumption is
dubious. the results are suspect”
Robert Solow (1956)
“I confess that I prefer true but imperfect knowledge, even if it leaves much indetermined
and unpredictable, to a pretence of exact knowledge that is likely to be false”
Hayek. Nobel Prize lecture (1974)
The conventional approach to exchange rate dynamics assumes rational individ-
uals interacting in a market where the driving forces of the system, or equilibrium
relations, are led by the macroeconomic fundamentals (see Mundel, 1963., Fleming,
1962., Dornbusch, 1976a., Dornbusch, 1976b., Frenkel, 1976). However, the empiri-
cal failures or puzzles of these macroeconomic models have opened the door to the
notion that macroeconomic fundamentals may not play an important role in driv-
ing macroeconomic outcomes, and thus ideas such as irrational behavior of market
participants have begun to appear in the literature.
The majority of international macroeconomic models rest on the assumptions of
perfect information and rational expectations. In these models, Purchasing Power
Parity (PPP), Uncovered Interest rate Parity (UIP) and the Fisher Parity hypothesis
are presented as equilibrium relations. However, as Solow noted in 1956, when
economic theory explains individual decision making and market outcomes, it makes
assumptions that may not be true. This thesis aims to examine what happens
to international macroeconomic outcomes, when individuals are assumed to hold
imperfect knowledge. Several important questions arise from this approach: Do
PPP, UIP and Fisher Parity still hold as equilibrium relations?. Does the Rational
2
Expectation Hypothesis make sense?. Are macroeconomic fundamentals the driving
forces of market outcomes?. Can policy makers influence the market?.
In order to answer these questions, this thesis follows a contemporary approach
of economic analysis known as Imperfect Knowledge Economics (IKE), see Fryd-
man and Goldberg (2007). The IKE model, in the tradition of early modern eco-
nomics, links mathematically the aggregate outcomes with the behavior and fore-
casting strategies of individuals. However, models based on IKE reflect modesty
about how complete the representations of individual behavior can be.
The idea that exchange rate dynamics are driven by ’irrational noise’ traders
who do not rely on macroeconomic fundamentals is not an assumption in IKE. On
the contrary, the model assumes that market participants must cope with imperfect
knowledge, which is not the same as the presumption that they are irrational. But
when perfect knowledge does not exist, although macroeconomic fundamentals play
an important role in the model, individuals speculate in their forecasting behavior
and the hypothesis of rational expectation fails to hold. This approach differs from
the speculative economic bubbles approach in the sense that in the IKE model,
macroeconomic fundamentals play an important role by being the driving force of
the system; as will be seen later, macroeconomic fundamentals are a reference point
in forecasting strategies, and therefore policy makers do interact and influence the
market.
The objective of this thesis is to test three equilibrium relations derived from the
REH, namely PPP, UIP and Fisher Parity, against two equilibrium relations that
are derived from IKE. To do this we apply the theoretical model of Frydman and
Goldberg (2007, 2011) under a methodology based on the Cointegrated Vector Au-
toregressive model (CVAR), with a particular focus on the foreign exchange markets
of Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Brazil. Both REH and IKE postulate relations that
can be estimated and tested within a multivariate cointegrating framework. One
of the advantages of the CVAR approach is that the three hypotheses of the REH
model mentioned above can and will be tested jointly. This is in sharp contrast
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to the existing literature which, to the best of our knowledge, generally tests each
hypothesis separately.
This rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly presents both
the REH and IKE model. Section 3 presents a brief review of the literature of REH
and IKE, including some empirical applications. Section 4 presents the econometric
methodology and summarizes the cointegration relations that will be tested under
REH and IKE. Lastly, section 5 concludes.
2 Rational Expectation Hypothesis vs. Imperfect
Knowledge Economics
2.1 REH framework
The ex-post return on a pure long position, rt+1, of an individual who invests abroad
can be written as:
rt+1 = st|t+1 − st + ift − idt , (1)
where st|t+1 − st is the expected change in nominal exchange rates, and ift and
idt are the foreign and domestic interest rates, respectively.
For each unit of investment, an individual would get 1
St
units at ift , that is the
money they receive in foreign currency. Then, the next period the individual sells
1
St
(1 + ift) at the exchange rate St+1 in order to get the earnings in the national
currency. Therefore the total return of the long position would be St+1
St
(1 + ift) −
(1+idt), which is the amount that an individual receives from the investment abroad
less what the individual would have received by investing in his/her own country.
Taking log approximation yields equation (1) . Note that the individual takes a long
position when a rise in st+1 is expected.
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To model this return, economists assume that the exchange rate adjusts to equate
demand and supply. Let rˆt|t+1 and uˆpt|t+1 denote all market participants’ point
forecast of rt+1 and of the premium that they require to hold an open position
in foreign exchange rate market, respectively. Equilibrium in the foreign exchange
market under perfect capital mobility can be written as:
rˆt|t+1 = uˆpt|t+1.
This equation holds whether individual preferences are represented as risk neutral
or risk averse, or are based on prospect theory. However, the assumption of REH
is that the conditional expectation rˆt|t+1 is equal to the conditional expectation of
rt+1. Further, if individual preferences are risk neutral, as generally assumed in the
REH models, then uˆpt|t+1 = 0. This leads to the conclusion that the ex-post return
has a conditional mean of zero and is uncorrelated with the causal variables that an
economist includes in his/her representation. The equilibrium of the REH is a no-
arbitrage condition where individuals are indifferent to the interest rates available
in the two countries.
With these assumptions, equation (2) is the well known Uncovered Interest Parity
condition:
∆st+1 = idt − ift . (2)
Another equilirbuim condition generally invoked by REH is Purchasing Power
Parity (PPP). PPP asks how much money would be needed to purchase the same
basket of goods and services in two countries. Then, if prices rise abroad, the
exchange rate St adjusts in order for PPP to hold. Thus Pdt = St · Pft or St = PdtPft .
Where Pdt is the domestic price, Pft is the foreign price. Taking logs yields:
st = pdt − pft . (3)
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If PPP holds for Colombia, Chile, Brazil and Mexico, then one would see in
Figure 1 that the black line should be equal to the gray line, or at least the difference
is stationary. With the series in logs. Table 2 shows the results of applying Dickey-
Fuller test to the real exchange rates of the countries under consideration. The
results suggest that for four countries it is not possible reject the null hypothesis
of a unit root1. Although for Mexico rejection occurs at the 5% (but not 1%)
significance level.
Taking the first difference of equation (3) and combining it with equation (2)
yields the Fisher Parity condition of the REH model:
idt −∆pdt+1 = idt −∆pdt|t+1 , (4)
where rdt = idt − ∆pdt|t+1 is the real interst rate or the Fisher parity condition
for country d. Under REH, equation (4) becomes rdt = idt −∆pdt+1 .
Therefore, PPP, UIP and Fisher Parity can be viewed as equilibrium relation-
ships with risk averse individuals, with no risk premium2 and where the efficient-
market hypothesis holds. The individuals interact in a market where prices reflect
all information and change instantly to reflect new information.
IKE framework3
The IKE model assumes that individuals agents are rational, in the sense that they
exploit profit opportunities. However, agents are assumed to have only imperfect
knowledge concerning the relationships driving the future payoffs of their decisions.
With theses assumptions equilibrium under REH does not hold and other equilib-
rium relation arise.
1The univariate unit root test is not the most appropriate test in a multivariate context. In the
next section stationarity will be tested in a multivariate context. In this section these results are
presented for illustration purpose only.
2Under REH and Imperfect capital mobility, the risk premium, uˆpt|t+1, is different from zero,
but PPP and fisher Parity holds. However Under REH the risk premium is stationary. Under
IKE the risk premium is not stationary. An important property in the dynamic of the model that
will be shown later.
3The presentation of the model in this section draws heavily on the IKE model presented by
Frydman and Goldberg (2004, 2007). Interpretation and simplifications in this sections are our.
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To build the IKE model, Frydman and Goldberg assumed that there are two
type of individuals: bulls who gamble on appreciation, and bears on depreciation;
also, the authors follow Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and assume that speculators
are loss averse, but they also augment prospect theory by assuming that an agent’s
degree of loss aversion increase with the size of her speculative position (endogenous
prospect theory). The above framework of the model leads to a key result: All
agents require a minimum premium before they are willing to commit any capital
to speculate in the foreign exchange market. This premium is called individual
uncertainty premium and denoted by u˜pt.
In this model, potential losses are not related to volatility, but to the divergence
of an agent’s forecast of an asset price, in this case the exchange rate sˆt+1. The
causal variables that an individual uses to form her forecast is made through her
evaluation of the gap defined as:
˜gapit(zt) = sˆ
i
t+1(zt)− ŝHBit (zt+1).
where ŝHBit (zt) denotes an individual’s assessment at time t of the historical
benchmark exchange rate.4If an agent is a bull (i.e., holds a long position), then
a rising gap creates more fear of an eventually countermovement. This greater
fear leads him/her to simultaneously revise up his/her assessment of the likelihoods
and/or magnitudes of the potential losses, which would result if the price were to
revert to its benchmark level. If the agent is a bear (i.e., holds a short position) then
a rising gap enhances his/her confidence that a countermovement is likely to occur.
Then if agents forecasts depend on their gaps, then as they raise these forecasts, they
simultaneously raise (lower) their uncertainty premium if they are bulls (bears).
In the aggregate, the uncertainty premium, upt, is equal to uncertainty premium
of the groups of bulls minus the uncertainty premium of bears. Note that market
uncertainty premium,upt, depends negatively on the bear’s uncertainty premium
because profits of bear occur when the return on holding foreign exchange is negative.
4This gap can also be defined in terms of the exchange rates, rather than the forecast of the
future exchange rate, or some weighted average of the two. The conclusion of the analysis are not
affected by either of these specification of the gap variable. (Frydman and Goldberg, 2007,p-199)
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The proceeding analysis replaces the UIP condition of REH with the Uncertainty
Adjusted UIP (UAUIP) of IKE condition:
(id,t − if,t) = ∆set+1 + upt. (5)
UAUIP seems similar to the UIP with imperfect capital mobility. However, the
IKE model assumes that uncertainty premium is a function of the gap effect, the
difference of st from his benchmark value, and so upt = f(st − pdt + pft). Replacing
upt in equation (5) gives the expression:
(idt − ift)− f(st − pdt + pft) = ∆set+1.
Lastly, IKE derive f(st − pdt + pft) = σ(st − pdt + pft), where σ is an unknown
parameter related to loss aversion, 0 < σ < 1. Thus equation (5) becomes:
(idt − ift) = ∆set+1 + σ(st − pdt + pft). (6)
An important implication of UAUIP is that the expected change of the nominal
exchange rates is not only related with the observed interest rate, but also with the
interest rate differential corrected by the uncertainty premium. Figure (2) depicts,
pppdt condition, along with upt = ∆st+1− (idt − ift) for Colombia, Chile, Brazil and
Mexico. According to IKE, the graphs should reflect a similar movement between
these series.
UAUIP enables us to explain the frequency of sign reversals in foreign exchange
rates returns that models based on risk-averse preference have found anomalous.
There are two types of forecasting strategies in the model: bulls expecting appre-
ciation while bears bet on depreciation. As the uncertainty premium is the main
determination of the return on foreign exchange rate. these different strategies are
the crucial keys to explain the speculative behavior of foreign exchange rate returns.
When there is a change in the causal variables from one time period to the next,
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such changes lead market participant to revise their forecast of the return and unit
loss form holding open position.
Fluctuations in the equilibrium depend on new realizations of the causal variables
and the exchange rate, and on how market participants revise their forecasting
strategies.The equilibrium premium on foreign exchange and the market´s forecast
of the future spot exchange rate can change in opposite directions between two
consecutive time periods. The intuition behind this result is that a higher set+1, for
example, creates an excess demand for foreign exchange, which bids up the exchange
rate and creates a gain for bulls and a loss for bears; bulls lower their degree of loss
aversion while it rises for bears. The resulting fall in the uncertainty premium for
the bulls and rise for the bears leads to a lower equilibrium premium, UAUIP implies
a large equilibrium premium when one side of the market, either the bulls or the
bears, forecast a large potential unit loss from speculation while the other side does
not.
In the model, forecast strategies of future price must change almost all the time;
strategies that initially generate profits, sooner o later lose the ability to continue
producing profits. That is the point that the REH approach ignores and at the same
time constitutes the foundation of IKE. The swings away from PPP are related with
these strategies, the swings occur because the market forecasting strategies of the
exchange rate st+1 moves persistently away from PPP, causing the current exchange
rate to follow it.
A further difference between REH and IKE is that under REH a stationary real
exchange rate is consistent with a stationary real interest rate differential, whereas
under IKE equilibrium is defined as a stationary cointegration relation between the
two. Indeed, when the real exchange rate is moving away from its benchmark value,
the real interest rate differential has to move in a way that the equilibrium in the
product market is restored, that is:
(st − pd,t − pf,t) = ω {(id,t − if,t)− (∆pd,t −∆pf,t)}+ t. (7)
9
3 Brief literature review
Macroeconomic models of the REH are compatible with equilibrium in the goods
market, a stationary real exchange rate and a stationary real interest rate differen-
tial. However, some authors have suggested that PPP, UIP and the Fisher Parity
condition may in fact be non-stationary; see for instance Froot et al. (1995), Rogoff
(1996), Rogoff et al. (2008), Lopez et al. (2005), and Papell et al. (2006). Persistent
deviations from the steady state are commonly known as puzzles or anomalies in the
international macroeconomic literature and as such have been the topic of extensive
research by several authors.
As an illustration, let us consider once again Figure 1 which presents the nominal
exchange and the price relations of Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Brazil with respect
to the price level in the United States. The systematic and persistent deviations
between relative prices and the exchange rate are known in the literature as exchange
rate swings. In order to explain such swings away from PPP, economists have
constructed two types of monetary models, namely, those based on flexible prices
and those based on sticky prices.
Flexible price monetary models assume that all prices including wages, adjust
instantaneously to their equilibrium. In these models, deviations from PPP are
caused by ’real disturbances’ to supplies. However long swings (as in Figure 1)
require that such shifts be large enough, and in the same direction over several
periods. But this behavior is not plausible in these models. Usually, in flexible-price
models shifts occur in one direction in one period but in the opposite direction in
the next one.
In sticky price monetary models, by contrast, goods and wages adjust sluggishly
in the short run, resulting in temporary deviations of exchange rate from PPP.
Dornbusch (1976) showed that in these models exchange rates are characterized by
an overshooting effect, so that temporary deviations from PPP are plausible and
also help to explain exchange rate volatility. However, such models can not generate
long swings such as the ones observed empirically.
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Literature about these anomalies or puzzles have been extensive. For example,
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) indicate that it is likely that the pattern of exchange
rate expectations lies behind many empirical puzzles found in international macroe-
conomics. An idea that has been taken up under IKE by Frydman and Goldberg
(2004, 2007, 2011), Frydman et al (2007) and Juselius (2009).
As indicated by Frydman and Goldberg (2004) There are two distinctive features
of IKE. First, the authors develop an alternative framework for modeling forecasting
behavior that recognizes that market participants posses only imperfect knowledge
about the relationships driving asset prices. Second, the authors replace expected-
utility theory with the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Thus the
authors build on prospect theory to model an idea due to Keynes (1936) according
to which the risk in financial markets is connected to departures of asset prices from
historical benchmark levels. As will be seen later, the uncertainly premium of the
model depends on discrepancies between exchange rate and the relative prices.
Within this framework two major conclusions arise. First, swings away from
parity can be based solely on macroeconomic fundamentals in contrast to the bubble
view. Therefore policy makers can alter the course of macroeconomic fundamentals.
Second, target zones and other intermediate exchange rate regimes may be effective
even in situations in which policy institutions are not credible.
Among the authors that have worked on the rational expectation hypothesis for
Latinamerican countries, Jongen et al (2008) present evidence in favor of agents with
irrational behavior for several countries. Using a different approach, Pesaran (1987)
examines the case of Brazil where rational expectation fails; see also Kaltenbrunner
and Nissanke (2009) on exchange rate dynamics in Brazil, not as a result of market
equilibrating forces, but as one of changing expectations of heterogeneous traders.
For Colombia, Otero and Ramirez (2006) use cointegration analysis and find support
for a weak version of PPP between Colombia and the US; however the authors focus
the analysis on PPP separately and do not take into account the two other equilib-
rium relationships derived from the REH, Echavarría, et al (2008) and Echavarría
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and Villamizar (2012) open the discussion about expectation of exchange rates by
arguing that “the forward rate is generally different from the future spot rate, mainly
because forecast errors are on average different from zero. This suggests that ex-
change rate expectations are not rational” (pp.1), Ojeda (2009) provides evidence in
favor of REH with unit root tests of PPP, but only after allowing for the presence
of structural breaks. Also Ojeda, et al (2013) show evidence that fundamentals also
play an important rate in the exchange rate dynamics at least for Colombia.
4 Empirical approach
As indicated in the Introduction, the aim of the thesis is to apply the cointegration
analysis through the formulation and estimation of a cointegrated vector autoregres-
sive (CVAR) model to a data set of exchange rates and prices in four Latinamerican
countries. In doing so, hypotheses derived from two fundamentally different ap-
proaches will be tested. On the one hand, the REH implies that an agent can fully
prespecify an economic model, leaving essentially no role for expectations. In this
modeling approach an equilibrium in the good market is compatible with a station-
ary real exchange and a stationary real interest rate differential. On the other hand,
IKE implies that individual’s forecasting strategies play an important role in driving
market outcomes. Because the individuals do not know the right model they have
different forecasting strategies. It means that a speculative behavior is present in
the model and when the real exchange moves away from its benchmark value (PPP),
the real interest rate differential has to move in order to compensate and restore the
product market.
The CVAR methodology, as laid out in Johansen (1988, 1996) and Juselius
(2006), provides economists, with a powerful tool to empirically asses these models.
The scenario approach presented in Juselius (2006) and Juselius (2010) is a useful
way of directly testing hypotheses derived from theory, thus not only guaranteeing
the theoretical but also the empirical validity of economic models. The following
variables will be used in the CVAR:
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[
(st − pdt + pft) ∆pdt ∆pft idt ift ∆st+1
]′
.
The following table presents a summary of the cointegration relations that arise
in both REH and IKE theoretical models:
Table 1. Cointegration relations
REH IKE
1. (st − pdt − pft) ∼ I(0) 1. b1(∆pdt −∆pft)− (idt − ift) + σ(st − pdt + pft) ∼ I(0)
2. (idt − ift −∆st+1) ∼ I(0) 2. b2∆st+1 − (idt − ift) + σ(st − pdt + pft) ∼ I(0)
3. (idt −∆pdt) ∼ I(0)
4. (ift −∆pft) ∼ I(0)
One of the postulates of IKE is that when there is instability, that is when
the market outcomes are away from their fundamentals, the individuals behave as
postulated by the cointegration relations 1 and 2 of the IKE model (see Table 1).
But also note that, if st = pdt − pft , that is when the exchange rate is driving by its
fundamentals, two things happen: First, the first cointegration relation of IKE is
simply a lineal combination of relations 1, 3 and 4 of the REH model. Second, the
second cointegration relation of REH is the same as the second cointegration relation
of IKE. Thus, one can conclude that in those cases where individuals observe that
outcomes are driven by fundamentals, there is no speculation and the REH holds.
4.1 Data
We are interested in testing the validity of the cointegration relations that arise from
both the REH and IKE models over a similar period of time for four Latin American
countries, namely: Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Brazil. However, in the database of
the International Monetary Fund, there are data available for Colombia since 1986
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for all the variables needed to apply the CVAR-methodology. Therefore, the sample
period to be considered for the four countries runs from 1986 to 2012.
Let d denotes Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Brazil domestic countries, while
the United States is the foreign one. The data consist of the following variables:
∆Pd = variation of consumer prices index for country d, ∆pd in logs.
∆Pus = variation of United States consumer prices index, ∆pus in logs.
id =the country d loan rate.
ius =the Unites States loan rate.
S =the exchange rate of country d/ US, s in logs.
ppp = s − pd + pus the real exchange rate between country d and United State
in logs.
Lower case letters denote variables in logarithms, with the exception of interest
rates. All annual effective interest rate have been divided by 4 to achieve compara-
bility between the quarterly inflation rates in log differences. Figure 3 presents the
series used to build the models.
4.2 The estimated model
The following CVAR model is estimated for each country:
4xt = Πxt−1 + Γ14xt−1 + · · ·+ Γk−14xt−k+1 + µ+ εt (8)
Within the CVAR model, the cointegration hypothesis can be formulated as
a reduced rank restriction on the Π matrix, also called the long-run matrix. If
xt ∼ I(1), then 4xt ∼ I(0) implying that Π cannot have full rank. Therefore Π
must have reduced rank, and so it can be decomposed as:
Π = αβ′,
where α is a p× r matrix that contains the adjustment coefficients, β is a p× r
matrix with the cointegration relations, r is the rank of Π, p is the number of endoge-
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nous variables in the VAR model, r ≤ p. µ denotes the deterministic components,
and εt is the error term. The term β′xt−1 is an r × 1 vector of stationary cointe-
gration relations. Then, all stochastic components are stationary in the model and
equation (8) is consistent.
For each country, the CVAR model contains 6 variables: ∆pt, rt, pppt, ∆st+1, rust
and ∆pust . Results not reported here suggest that rust and ∆pust can be regarded as
exogenous variables, that is, they are variable that affect the other country-specific
variables in the system, but are not affected by them. These results can be also
justified based on economic intuition. Thus, in all models under consideration, both
the United States inflation and interest rate are regarded as exogenous variables.
Therefore the CVAR model contains, p = 4 endogenous variables, ∆pt, rt, pppt and
∆st+1; and 2 exogenous ones, rust and ∆pust .
Due to the regime changes in the Latinamerican’s exchange rate systems, struc-
tural level breaks were also included in the vectors. In September 1999 the Colom-
bia’s exchange rate band system was eliminated to allow a freely floating regime.
Also Chile adopted inflation targeting scheme as well as flexible exchange rate sys-
tem in September 1999. In Mexico at the end of 1994 fixed exchange regime was
eliminated. Finally, in January 1999 Brazil adopted a free exchange rate system.
However, these level breaks were statistically significant in the cointegrated vector
only for Colombia and Mexico. Additionally, due to the several changes in the fiscal
and monetary policy in Brazil 1994, it was necessary introduce a break level vari-
able in that period. For the four countries in the sample, there are 4 lags within the
CVAR models and seasonal centered dummy variables. Lately, to improve the di-
agnostic of the residuals, impulse dummy variables were incorporated in the models
for Colombia and Mexico 5.
5More specifically, for Colombia the dummy variable (denoted 1999q2) takes the value of one in
the second quarter of 1999, and zero elsewhere. For Mexico the dummy variable (denoted 1995q1)
takes the value of one in the first quarter of 1995, and zero elsewhere.
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4.3 Rank determination
Juselius (2006) argues that the determination of the cointegration rank may be a
difficult choice. Indeed, the rank influences all subsequent inference and itself is
a decisive step in the empirical analysis. However, macroeconomic theory gives
insights about the rank of the Π matrix. The REH model postulates at least r=3
(PPP, UIP, FP and/or Interest rate differential), while IKE postulates r=2.
Table 3 presents the rank test for all countries in the sample, p−r are the common
trends or pushing forces and r are the cointegration relations. Crucial results emerge
from these results, essentially the rank of Π let us classify the four countries in two
groups. Colombia and Chile form the first group with r=2, Mexico and Brazil, the
second group with r=3. For the former group we can postulate that IKE describes
better the macroeconomic outcomes, for the latter is the REH who better explains
these outcomes. However, at this point it is premature to make these conclusions
since we have not yet identified the cointegrated vectors.
4.4 Testing hypotheses on cointegration: REH or IKE?
This section identify the long-run structure by introducing restrictions on β′xt−1,
The test tests whether the cointegrated vector is stationary, that is the null hypoth-
esis β′xt−1 ∼ I(0).
Under r=2
• Model IKE1 :
[
∆pt rt pppt ∆st+1 r
us
t ∆p
us
t
]
·
 0 β12 β13 β14 β15 0
β21 β22 β23 0 β24 β25

′
• Model IKE∗1 :
[
∆pt rt pppt ∆st+1 r
us
t ∆p
us
t
]
·
 0 −β12 β13 β14 β12 0
β21 −β22 β23 0 −β22 −β21

′
• Model REH1 :
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[
∆pt rt pppt ∆st+1 r
us
t ∆p
us
t
]
·
 0 β12 0 β14 β15 0
β21 β22 0 0 β24 β25

′
• Model REH∗1 :
[
∆pt rt pppt ∆st+1 r
us
t ∆p
us
t
]
·
 0 −β12 0 β14 β12 0
β21 −β22 0 0 −β22 −β21

′
Note that the models with stars IKE∗1 andREH∗1 , have the same zero restrictions
on beta that IKE1 and REH1, but also the first ones have a magnitude and sign
restrictions.
For both the IKE1 and IKE∗1 we are testing the equilibrium conditions of the
IKE model (see Table 1). However, it is important to clarify that if pppt is stationary,
then it is possible not reject the nule hypothesis of stationarity in the IKE model.
However, this does not mean that IKE is the right model, this is because the sum of
stationary variables is also stationary. So in that particular case the model is also
compatible with the sum of stationary relations of the REH. Then REH could be
the right model as well.
For that reason, although it makes not sense to test REH under r=2, because
REH implies at least r=3. We present the cases β13 = β23 = 0, which are the cases
where IKE1 and IKE∗1 change to REH1 and REH∗1 . In these cases we are testing
UIP and Interest rate differential, both equilibrium condition of REH model. Thus,
if REH1 and REH∗1 are not equilibrium relation but IKE1 and IKE∗1 are, in these
cases we can be sure that IKE is the right model because it’s clear that pppt is
needed in the cointegrated vector.
Under r=3
• Model REH1:
[
∆pt rt pppt ∆st+1 r
us
t ∆p
us
t
]
·

0 β12 0 β14 β15 0
β21 β22 0 0 β24 β25
0 0 β33 0 0 0

′
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• Model REH∗2 :
[
∆pt rt pppt ∆st+1 r
us
t ∆p
us
t
]
·

0 −β12 0 β14 β12 0
β21 −β22 0 0 −β22 −β21
0 0 β33 0 0 0

′
Table 4 presents the results of the χ2(v) tests of the cointegrated vectors. As we
can see, Colombia is the strongest case where the IKE equilibrium relation cannot
be rejected. Imposing the restrictions implied by model IKE1. Colombia has a
p−value of 0.954 which is clearly not rejected. Also, the p−value of IKE∗1 is 0.803
which is high. Note, that in the models REH1 and REH∗1 , the nule hypotheses
of stationarity are rejected. Therefore, IKE appears to be the model which better
describes the macroeconomic outcomes of Colombia over the sample period under
consideration.
For Chile the results reported in Table 4 suggest that the equilibrium relation
implied by IKE cannot be rejected. However, these results are not as stronger as
those observed for the case of Colombia. Additionally, the p − value of the model
REH1 has a p− value of 0.10, a value near to the one of the IKE∗1 . Therefore, we
opt for adopting the view of chile being a borderline case.
Regarding, Mexico and Brazil, these are countries in favor of the REH. Indeed,
in both cases the cointegration analysis suggests r = 3 and the equilibrium relations
implied by REH are not rejected by the data either. However in Brazil pppt does not
hold as an equilibrium, while the Fisher Parity condition, the interest rate differential
and the UIP conditions were found to be stationary relations. For Mexico the the
equilibrium relations of the REH model behave as stationary cointegrated vectors.
4.5 The cointegrated vectors
As the IKE∗1 and REH∗1 vectors appears to be the best specification, in the sense
they include sign and magnitude restrictions, these cointegrated vectors are reported
in this subsection. To unify the analysis, β vector was normalized by the coefficient
of the interest rate in the cases of Colombia, Chile and Mexico. Table 5 presents
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the β and α vectors for all countries. As can be seen, in all models the t− statitic
of the β vectors, presented in parentheses, are always higher than 1.96, Therefore,
all variables are needed in the cointegrated vectors. Also, all the vectors have the
correct sign postulated by the IKE and REH models.
In contrast to the REH model, one of the main implications of the IKE is that
pppt is not stationary by itself. Instead, other variables are needed to build a sta-
tionary relation. Therefore, the inclusion of pppt in the IKE cointegrated vectors
has a particular interest, since this variable should be always statistically significant,
pppt represents the uncertainty premium function, which is a function of the gap
effect upt = σ(s− pdt + pft). In equation (6) we can see upt implies that an increase
in ∆set+1 will lead an excess of demand for the foreign exchange rate, where the
σ coefficient is related to the loss averse parameter. For Colombia and Chile this
parameter is significant. Also, within each country the magnitude of the coefficient
in the two cointegrated vectors is quite similar, between zero and one, as it was
expected.
Although the cointegrated vectors of Mexico and Brazil are in favor of the REH,
Mexico is the only country in which it is possible to find a lineal combination that
makes pppt stationary by itself. These results are in line with the stationary test
presented in table 66. The test shows that Mexico is the only country where pppt is
a stationary relation.
A final test that shows the importance of the pppt variable in the IKE models, is
the test of unit vector in alpha presented in Table 7. This test shows which variable
are the pushing forces of the system and which are purely of adjusting (they only
have transitory effects on the other variables). As we can see in the countries where
IKE holds, pppt is presented as one of the pushing force of the system. Countries
where REH holds the hypotheses of pppt as a pushing force is rejected.
6Juselius and Jonhansen postulate the multivariate stationary test more appropriated than an
univariate test
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5 Final considerations
Using a CVAR approach, we find that macroeconomic outcomes for Colombia and
Chile appear to be better described by the IKE model, while REH seems to hold best
for Mexico and Brazil. In the particular case of Colombia, in 2012 the Colombian
peso was the most appreciated currency against the US dollar within a sample of 170
currencies. This thesis argues that such appreciation could have taken place because
of speculative behavior of agents with imperfect knowledge regarding future payoffs.
Therefore, it may well be the case that individuals are either not receiving the right
signals from the market or that they do not have the right model to form their
expectations.
According to the 2012 Financial Development Report of the World Economic
Forum, Brazil is the country with the best financial stability indicator, followed by
Chile, Mexico and Colombia. Therefore, one can conjecture that the more advanced
the financial market, the more knowledge individuals will have about their markets.
Thus, coutries with developed financial systems are more likely to be economies
where the REH hold, while IKE appears more consistent with economies with less
developed financial markets.
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Figure 1: Series used to test purchasing power parity (PPP)
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Figure 2: Series used to test uncertainty adjusted uncovered interest parity (UAUIP)
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Figure 3: Time series used to the CVAR model
Colombia
Exchange rates in logs Inflation Interest rate
Chile
Exchange rates in logs Inflation Interest rate
Mexico
Exchange rates in logs Inflation Interest rate
Brazil
Exchange rates in logs Inflation Interest rate
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Table 2. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation for pppt
Colombia Chile Mexico Brazil
t− satistics -0.421 -2.035 -3.131 -2.036
Prob 0.9004 0.2716 0.027 0.2710
Observations 102 102 102 102
Note: The tests are performed using 12 lags of the dependent variable.
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Table 3: Rank trace tests
p− r r Colombia Chile Mexico Brazil
4 0 97.335
(0.000)
121.919
(0.000)
129.723
(0.000)
118.740
(0.000)
3 1 57.924
(0.03)
46.507
(0.081)
77.608
(0.000)
79.172
(0.000)
2 2 27.596
(0.26)
20.650
(0.402)
42.162
(0.010)
43.151
(0.006)
1 3 5.676
(0.87)
2.630
(0.964)
6.929
(0.759)
11.040
(0.359)
Note: Structural change and dummy variables are included in the test. Therefore,
test and p− value in parentheses are generated using the simulation techniques
available in the CATS version 2.0 for RATS software.
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Table 4: Testing the stationarity
Colombia Chile Mexico Brazil
r=2
IKE1
0.331
(0.954)
4.879
(0.186)
n.d. n.d.
IKE∗1
3.048
(0.803)
4.997
(0.150)
n.d. n.d.
REH1
13.830
(0.017)
10.411
(0.108)
n.d. n.d.
REH∗1
21.484
(0.006)
12.383
(0.091)
n.d. n.d.
r=3
REH2 n.d. n.d.
4.502
(0.480)
5.864(a)
(0.556)
REH∗2 n.d. n.d.
10.530
(0.230)
6.963(a)
(0.541)
Note: p− values of theχ2(v)test in parentheses. Structural change and dummy
variable are included in the test. (a) This replaces the third cointegration relation
by the restrictions implied by the Fisher parity condition.
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Table 6: Test of stationarity
∆pt rt pppt ∆st+1
Colombia 9.970
(0.007)
2.416
(0.299)
18.679
(0.000)
4.991
(0.082)
Chile 1.135
(0.567)
4.687
(0.096)
21.103
(0.000)
1.308
(0.520)
Mexico 1.573
(0.210)
2.298
(0.130)
2.990
(0.084)
1.030
(0.164)
Brazil 6.184
(0.045)
6.494
(0.039)
25.586
(0.000)
6.512
(0.039)
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Table 7: Test of Unit vector in alpha
∆pt rt pppt ∆st+1
Colombia 18.027
(0.000)
2.893
(0.235)
1.403
(0.496)
14.001
(0.001)
Chile 10.642
(0.005)
5.793
(0.055)
0.503
(0.778)
8.440
(0.015)
Mexico 3.639
(0.056)
17.572
(0.000)
4.626
(0.031)
1.228
(0.268)
Brazil 1.049
(0.306)
1.970
(0.160)
10.176
(0.001)
0.029
(0.865)
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